







N. Boccard and R. Calcagno
June 1999
Asymmetries of information in centralized order-
driven markets
We would like to thank Ronald Anderson, Olivier Gossner, Jean-Francois Mertens for their valuable sug-
gestions and comments.
CORE, UCL and Université de Liège.
CORE and IRES, UCL. Financial support from CORE and IRES in the PAI program of the Université
Catholique de Louvain. E-mail : calcagno@ires.ucl.ac.be
We study the e¢ciency of the equilibrium price in a centralized, order-driven market
where many asymmetrically informed traders are active for many periods. We show that
asymmetries of information can lead to sub-optimal information revelation with respect
to the symmetric case. In particular, we assess that the more precise the information
the higher the incentive to reveal it, and that the value of private information is related
to the volume of exogenous trade present on the market. Moreover, we prove that any
informed trader, whatever his information, reveals its private signal during an active phase
of the market, concluding that long pre-opening phases are not e¤ective as an information
discovering device in the presence of strategic players.
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1 Introduction
Professional traders often collect accurate information about the future value of an asset, and
it is therefore likely that they will use it strategically. Doing this, they should be aware of
two risks: to be identied as insiders, since insider trading is illegal, and avoid the imitation
e¤ect by the other operators. If e¢ciency of markets is a goal of a market designer, one
should look for a mechanism guaranteeing the fastest information disclosure in the presence
of strategic insiders. This task requires the analysis of the incentives for the insiders to reveal
their private information. In dealing with this problem, we notice that private information
is a peculiar good, intrinsically non homogeneous, since even the same condential news
could be interpreted di¤erently by economic agents di¤ering in experience or education. For
these reasons we think that private information originating from diverse sources (condential
or technical reports) is spread asymmetrically among (potentially many) individuals. The
non-homogeneity of information is then an intrinsic characteristic of this good. In order
to formalize this, we assume that insiders receive private signals having di¤erent precisions.
Contrary to the model studied by Kyle & Wang (1997) we will assume as in the traditional
rational expectation paradigm that these di¤erent precisions are commonly known by the
agents; our model is then in a sense a particular case of Kyle & Wang (1997), but it introduces
a dynamic dimension in the choice of information revelation. Our purpose is in fact to
understand if asymmetrically informed traders reveal their inside information as soon as they
get it.
Microstructure literature has been concerned with a limited form of information asym-
metry, i.e. situations of information monopoly. Here we focus on oligopoly of information.
Intuitively, the competition between insiders with di¤erentinformation should be strategically
di¤erent from the (perfect) competition between equally informed traders. The implications
in terms of e¢ciency of prices could be completely di¤erent in the two cases. In this paper we
assess the incentive for the better informed trader to reveal his information in the beginning
of the game. On the other hand, we show that there exist equilibria in which the trader who
receives the less precise signal waits until the last stage to reveal his information, since at
that stage he is e¤ectively the only agent possessing an informational advantage. We nd as
in Kyle & Wang that the best informed trader (in their contest the overcondent one) trade
more aggressively on his information, since it has an higher precision.
The information revelation is often studied in markets characterized by distinct phases
of activity. In many existing stock markets (e.g., NYSE, Paris, Madrid) the working day is
preceded by a phase called pre-opening where orders come to the market and equilibrium
prices are quoted, but no exchanges occur until the . The existence of these pre-opening
phases is often motivated for purposes of information disclosure. Biais, Hillion & Spatt (1997)
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have studied empirically the information disclosure process during the pre-opening period in
the Paris Bourse. They show that informed traders take care not to reveal their information
their opponents in such periods where no trades occur. Insiders may be reluctant to
disclose their information in order to use it optimally in later trades, but they also have an
incentive to place informative orders (at least at the end of the pre-opening stage) because of
the risk of a communication breakdown in the last minutes, in order to take advantage of the
large liquidity trade present on the market at 10:00, and also for priority rules in execution
of equal orders that exist in many exchange markets (for ex. the Paris Bourse). Hence, a
long pre-opening phase seems to be unuseful for e¢ciency purposes, since all the serious
orders are submitted at the very end of that phase. In our paper we show why insiders wait
until the last minutes to submit true orders, verifying that it is not optimal to give to their
opponents an information advantage for an active market phase.
Existing works on insider trading literature start with the contribution of Kyle (1985), who
develops a model in which a single privately informed trader optimally exploits his monopoly
power over several periods of trade. The main result is that the optimal behavior of the
informed trader is to gradually incorporate his information into the price in order to keep the
market depth constant.
Holden & Subrahmanyam (1992) extend the Kyle model by adding many equally informed
traders. This generates Bertrand competition between traders and enables those authors to
obtain a rapid revelation of information in contrast to Kyles result even in the limiting case
of two insiders. Indeed, as all insiders share the private information, any revelation
by one of them removes the informational advantage of the others. Hence, all insiders have
an incentive to use (and thus reveal) immediately their common private information. As we
have said before, a problem closely related our model is presented by Kyle & Wang (1997) in
a static model with di¤erences in beliefs.
The pre-opening stage existing in many stock exchanges gives us the opportunity to study
theoretically whether it plays e¢ciently the role of a price discovery device in the presence
of informed traders. Vives (1995) supports this view claiming that it permits the formation
of an e¢cient price with a process of successive o¤ers by the investors similar to the classical
Walrasian tatônnementpro cess. He shows that the more the tatônnement process lasts, the
more prices convey information. Hence he can conclude that this information tâtonnement
proves e¤ective in resolving quickly the uncertaintyabout the fundamentalvalue of the asset.
This theoretical result is not supported by empirical studies (as already mentioned) and
lacks game theoretical foundation. The fact that traders wait until the very last minute to
submit revealing orders (Biais & al. (1997)) seems totally in contrast with the assumption of
competitive t âtonnement made by Vives (1995), where furthermore no strategic consideration
is made.
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We consider a three stages game describing a centralized and order-driven market with
two insiders having asymmetric private information. We enquire about the incentives to
reveal the private information in the rst two stages, since we know by simple backward
induction argument that it is always optimal to reveal it in the last one (in fact, once the
information is publicly revealed, its value is zero, hence the insider has to exploit it before the
public announcement). On the one hand, using private information to trade with uninformed
agents is benecial but an insider gives an advantage to its competitor for the last stage. We
show that the amount of liquidity trade present on the market can be considered as a cake
to be divided between the two insiders. If the size of this cake increases in the last stage,
only the best informed trader reveals before this last stage. In the case this cake is very
large, nobody reveals before the last stage.
At each stage the informed traders and the liquidity traders simultaneously choose the
quantities they trade. The insiders information consists of their observation of two signals
with di¤erent precision correlated with the liquidation value of the asset, of the past history
of prices and volumes, and they also observe, as in Kyle (1985), the amount of liquidity
trade present into the market. In stage zero, orders are notional, in the sense that they are
not concluded: here we do not address the problem of the of the pre-opening and
the strategic considerations inherited, but we only study if any information revelation can
occur in a stage of ctitious trade. Stages one and two are usual periods of market activity.
Market makers set a price and trade the quantity which clears the market. The competition
between them makes the equilibrium price equal to the expected value of the asset given
the observable order ows; market makers do not observe the individual demands but only
the aggregated order ow. Consequently, the equilibrium price changes only if the successive
order ows contain new information.
We characterize the set of equilibria in linear strategies for any couple of exogenous liq-
uidity trade volume respectively in stage one and two. For a constant volume across periods,
the two players reveal their signal in the rst stage if their information is almost equally pre-
cise (the result of Holden & Subrahmanyam). However, if asymmetries are large, the trader
with better information reveals and the opponent conceals in the rst period. The better
informed trader will trade more aggressively on his information given that market makers
cannot detect perfectly his move. Hence, the more informed player acts as a leader in the
information game and must use his advantage immediately.
The less informed trader, however, may conceal his type until the last stage during which
he can exploit an informational advantage that was not relevant in the previous stages for
the presence of a better informed opponent. The competition between asymmetric agents is
not of Bertrand-type because the information released by the traders is non-homogeneous.
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2.1 Players and timing
Whenever a formula or denition is given for only the formula is obtained by interverting
symbols and , otherwise both the formulae are given.
We will describe in the appendix the organization of the Paris Bourse, in order to motivate our assumptions
on the timing of the trading day.
period volume, traders tend to conceal their information in order to exploit it at a more
protable stage. However, the asymmetric equilibrium described before exists untilthe volume
of the rst period is one-tenth of that of the second one.
With as slightly di¤erent model, we show that revelation during the pre-opening is not
rational, and that the equilibrium set of the game does not change adding a notional trade
stage before the game. To reveal before the opening makes the opponent stronger since he
can rely on a two-signals information and act even more aggressively once the market is open.
As a trade-o¤, the revelation before the opening allow the trader to get advantage in case
of equal orders (for priority reasons considered for example in Paris) or to protect himself in
case of a communication breakdown. We quantify the expected loss due to earlier revelation;
this permits to determine when information will be released as a function of the probability
of a tie in orders or a communication breakdown.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the three-stage model with
simultaneous moves that generalizes Kyle (1985) to the case of asymmetric insiders. We solve
the market makers equilibrium in section 3; then we tackle the informed traders problem in
the various stages. The results are gathered in section 5. In section 6, we develop a sequential
version of the game and nally section 7 collects conclusions. The appendix contains a brief
description of the Paris Bourse trading organization that has motivated our setup (section
8.1) and the set of calculations not included in the body of the text (sections 8.2 to 8.5).
We study a market for a risky asset where the exchanges occur between three kinds of
agents: informed agents, market makers and liquidity traders. The risky asset has a random
liquidation value normally distributed with Normal law . Trader observes a private
signal where the error term has law and is interpreted as the ex-ante
precision with which the trader can guess the true value of . All the three random variables
, , and are assumed to be independent.
We model the trading day in three stages. Stage zero represents the pre-opening phase
which is purely notional in the sense that no trade takes place during this initial stage. Yet,
orders are collected and a theoretical equilibrium price is computed. This price is observed
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As the reader can realize, the strategy space is then considerably small; our purpose is in fact to stress the
dynamic information revelation strategies, that would be impossible from an analytic point of view if we enlarge
the strategy space.
Stages one and two represents normal periods of market activity. Possible way of thinking
if this is to refer to the rules in the Paris Bourse. There, although the pre-opening last
o¢cially from 8:30 until 10:00, we interpret the last minutes as stage one, where for the time
constraint, it is not possible to cancel a notional order anymore. All orders submitted in that
stage are then entered into the electronic order book and become e¤ective; the xing price is
then our equilibrium price for stage one.
Each of stages 1 and 2 is structured as follows: the informed players choose the quantities
they trade, and knowing their signals while liquiditytraders submit an aggregated order
. We normalize their average trade to . Insiders observe the realization
of , but market makers do not. Given the realized order ow , market
makers formulate an equilibrium price and trade the quantities that clear the market. The
ex-post prot is while the ex-interim expectation conditional on trader s private
information is We will consider also the ex-ante prot obtained
integrating the latter with respect to the joint measure of private signals and liquidity trade.
As in Kyle (1985, 89), we assume for tractability that market makers price the asset
in all 3 periods according to a linear rule for . Perfect
competition between market makers also guarantees a weak form of e¢ciency: the
price is equal to the expectation of conditional on the observed order ows of the
current and previous stages ( will depend on the previously observed order ow ).
Trader plays a strategy linear with respect to his private information i.e.,
. This can be interpreted as an ex-ante commitment to a particular reve-
lation rule (concealing its information amounts to choose ). We are thus excluding
partially revealing strategies again for analytic tractability of the model. Moreover, we
exclude that players can explicitly manipulate their signal: is a function of the true
As in Kyle (1985) and Admati & Peiderer (1987), we suppose that informed traders
behave strategically one against the other competitively against the market makers
i.e., they do not manipulate the market makers pricing rule. It is then natural to assume
that prot maximization occurs independently in stages 1 and 2 .
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3 Market Makers behavior
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Our rst task is to assess how the revelation of private information in the rst stage a¤ects the
pricing function used by the market makers in the second stage. This behavior is at the heart
of our model. Because market makers use the xing price and its underlying information to
name prices later in the day, insiders may not want to reveal an information that will bring
the price too close to their private expectation of the underlying value of the asset.
We require markets to be e¢cient (at least in a weak sense) in any stage, that means that
prices and convey all the information incorporated in the two respective
order ows. Formally, this implies that
(1)
(2)
These two conditions have a remarkable interpretation obtained by the application of iterated
conditional expectation. In e¢cient markets, prices are martingales with respect to the public
information i.e., the order ows.
(3)
A prerequisite to the derivation of prices is to be able to compute the functional form of
the order ows and . We thus assume a linear pricing rule in both periods.
(4)
(5)
This will imply that in the game played by the informed traders, the order ows take the
following simple functional forms.
(6)
(7)
Since and have been previously assumed to have zero mean, it is also the
case for and : notice that and have no informational role. A useful property of
normal variables is that the conditional expectation is a linear function of the observations,
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According to the standard projection of normal variables : if where is independent of and
all three variables have zero mean, then
E v=! E E v=! ;! =! a ! a E ! =!
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By the law of iterated expectations, we have
(9)
(10)
Notice that those formulae are independent of the timing of the game at stake, they only
reect properties of the underlying random variables. It is the derivation of the market depths
and that will depend on the timing of the game.
We will check that if is non informative (traders play independently of their private
signal in the rst stage) then while . This is perfectly consistent with (9) and
(10) because the rst one becomes which is true in the non informative case as
while the second equation becomes ( 8) for a single conditioning variable.
Considering the functional form of given by (6), we have
(11)
with Remember that we assume that market makers
do not know the realization of
Given (1) and (4) and combining it with (11), we obtain Identifying
and in this linear equation, we get and . Developing the
variance, we solve for the market depth of the rst period, obtaining
(12)
The ex-ante variance of exogenous trade positively inuence the depth of the market as
in Kyle (1985).
To nd and , we use similar techniques in appendix 8.2. First, we rewrite (9) using
formulae (6) and (7) to expand With a completely symmetric rewriting of (10),
we are able to solve for and in the variables and Combining the two expressions
for the price (5) and (8), we can write
Identifying the coe¢cients of this linear equation, we obtain and . The
last equality enables to solve for in a fashion similar to that used for (see the Appendix
4.2, (40)-(41)) and another complex expression for (see (42)) Both depend on the rst
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The trades of stage 1 might reveal some private information. Indeed, traders observe the
order ow and they know the amount of liquidity trade . Trader can
then recognize the order of trader and if the latter has played according a revealing strategy
trader can deduce the private signal and thus increase his private information.
We denote the information revealed to market makers at the beginning of stage
and the private information of trader in that stage. Since we consider only full revelation






Observe that is always ner than the observation of the total order ow which
can therefore be safely ignored in the second stage calculations. In the symmetric revelation
case, the second period is a Cournot game with complete information i.e., each pair
denes a proper subgame. The game is solved for any couple of given private signals in the
space of linear strategies. When only trader reveals his information in stage one, trader
behaves as in the previous case, since he knows . In equilibrium, trader , despite the
fact that he does not know the signal , anticipates the rule used by his opponent.
Hence, we deal with a form of Stackelberg game. When no revelation has occurred, traders
play a game with incomplete information on both sides. Each trader has to optimize against
a rule and not against a single order.
An obvious consequence of the nite number of stages in the game is that informed
traders have an incentive to use their private information in stage 2, thus conveys a lot of
information about the underlying liquidation value of the asset. Yet, if one or both traders
have revealed information during the rst stage, then the order ow is also an informative
statistic for the market makers.
According to our behavioral assumptions, we analyze a matrix game. We study
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4.2 Both players conceal their information (CC case)
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Both traders conceal in stage 1 so that
public information in stage 2 is empty
Trader reveals in stage 1, so that trader
has an added information in stage 2
Reverse of the preceding case
Both trader reveal in stage 1 and have a
symmetric information in stage 2
For any pair of strategies the ex-ante global prot is the sum of
prots obtained in each active trading stage
We rst study the best reply of trader when trader conceals his information in stage
1 to show that he ought to reveal even though he is giving an advantage to for the second
stage i.e., is greater than . Thanks to this result, there is (almost) always revelation
in equilibrium. It is then su¢cient to solve the trade-o¤ between concealing and revealing for
a trader who face a (rational) revealing player i.e., determine when is greater than
In solving the game by backward induction we shall develop the minimal amount of
calculation in the body of the text; complex computations are deferred to the appendices.
Trader places an order independent of his private signal. As trader chooses to conceal
his own information, he places a market order constant across . The rst stage order
ow contains no information on the underlying value of the asset, thus
, the closing price of the previous day which is normalized to
zero (as it is assumed to be e¢cient). The zero prot condition for market makers leads to
so that any is indeed optimal. The commitment by informed traders to conceal
their information drives their rst period prots to zero on average. In terms of sensitivity
to the signals, we have and
The second stage starts with an empty public information set and private
information set The ex-post prot for trader of a trade is As it is
always optimal to use its information in the last stage of the game, the ex-interim prot is
(13)
Substituting for the market makers strategy and using the order ow
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Using the specic form of trader s linear strategy , the rst
order condition (FOC) for trader reads
(14)
The projectionresult for normal variables leads to . Using
we can identify the intercept and the slope of the linear strategy to obtain
and
Putting together the symmetric equations for , we solve the system to get
and (15)
We now use our previous computation regarding the market makers pricing rule. Since
there is no revelation in stage one, must be zero. Substituting the traders optimal strategies
in the order ow denition leads to
(16)
with and
The analysis of the rst period has shown that is always nil, hence the market depth is
innite i.e., . Using the notation developed in the previous sub-section,



















4.2.2 Ex-ante prots in the CC case
2
22


































































ps ; s  qs qs u 

u s  s
 
ss i
sp s E s = s































( +2 ) +( +2 )
3+ 4 + 4 + 4
[] =
[~+ ] = [~ ] =
+1
[~ ] = ( )
( ) = ( )
=
()




[] = [ ~ ] = ~
( ) ~
=  ( )
=
()
3( 3+ 4 + 4 + 4 )
( + 2) (1 + )
()
+1
>From (15), we derive the optimal orders
(18)
and the equilibrium price is
Notice that the equilibrium price function pools all the information as it depends on
and . The ex-interim prot of trader is the expected prot conditional on its pri-
vate information , thus we have to average with respect to using
(the error terms are independent random variables).
Furthermore, straightforward algebraic manipulations show that
Hence, substituting into (13) and using ( 18), we get the traditional Cournot formula for the
expected prot conditional on the private signal in the second stage (ex-interim prot).
(19)
We use , and the independence of and to compute the
ex-ante expectation of (before knowing the realization of and ) to obtain an










4.3.1 Second period analysis
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4.3 Trader reveals while conceal (RC case)
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We solve this case by backward induction since in the rst stage, the optimal strategy for the
trader who reveals depends on the second stage behaviors.. At the beginning of stage 2, the
public information in the present context is , thus and so
that
and
The FOC for trader is still
(21)
Because rm knows its FOC reads
(22)
and solving, we obtain
(23)
We can now solve for the more informed trader substituting (23) in (22)
(24)
Observe from (23) that the slope term for trader is like in the previous complete
information case while trader has a more complex behavior since he puts more weight on
his own information.
The optimal market orders are used to recompute the order ow.
(25)
where , and . We can now compute the price
(26)
Notice that and , thus the ex-interim



































































4.3.2 First period analysis in the RC case
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We have previously assumed that insiders are not manipulating the market makers pricing
rule of the current period, thus it is natural to assume that they would not inuence
with their rst stage strategies through a strategic manipulation of . To comply with
our previous notations, we write the linear pricing rule of the market makers as
since in the present case the constant demand of trader adds a non
informative constant term in the rst period order ow. The rst stage prot for trader is
Solving the two maximization problems (with the same procedure used before) gives
(29)
(30)
Notice that is independent of since player voluntary ignores his private information
at stage 1. As trader is revealing its private information, the order ow observed by market
makers conveys some of it.
(31)
where and .
Recalling that and the expression for given in ( 12) we get the following result
(32)
As expected, is increasing in because the more precise the signal, the more aggres-
sive the trader and the more aggressive the market makers response that reduces the depth
of the market.
































































































If liquidity trade is constant across stages 1 and 2, it is optimal to reveal its
information when the opponent conceals it.
Proof
Q.E.D.
Taking into account , and the independence of and the
ex-ante expectation is
(34)
As intuition would suggest, there is a rst stage advantage to reveal since while
we saw that Having solved for the rst stage price equilibrium, we can nd out the
updating performed by the market makers in the second period. We compute the complex
form of which is positive like i.e., the market makers are spreading their reactiveness
towards adverse selection over the two periods of trade. Plugging and back into (27),
we obtain a formula for that is similar to that of (cf. 20) albeit more complex. The
global ex-ante prot, appears to be an increasing and concave function of
and (cf. appendix 8.3).
If trader uses his private information in stage 1, he makes prots but he starts stage 2
with a handicap having made the second period price come closer to its own estimation of
the underlying asset value. Whatever the ranking between and , trader starts stage 2
with a better information since it is the aggregate of and . Noticing that hedging
and liquidity orders are presumably spread over the day in an equal manner, we are now in
position to derive a rst result.
We have normalized the precision of the underlying asset to unity, thus the
relevant range for the precision parameters and is with Both and
are polynomial fractions of and whose coe¢cients are positive, thus denominators
are never zero on the relevant range so that we can rely on a graphical representations.
Assuming an ex-ante identical volume of trade in stages 1 and 2 amounts to set For
that specication of the parameters, the graph of is displayed on gure 1 below
( on the right axis, on the left axis), it is indeed a positive function. More precisely,
because is only slightly lesser than can say that the benet of revealing is the
















































































4.4 Trader conceals while reveals (CR case)
4.5 Traders and reveal (RR case)
The preceding lemma implies that the equilibrium is found by looking at a traders best
reply when the other trader reveals his private information. In this CR case we nd the best
non-informative reply for to the optimal revealing strategy of . This is di¤erent from the
RC case before, the di¤erence being that trader is now concealing optimally his information
while in the RC case analyzed before, trader was playing any concealing strategy. The full
analysis performed in appendix 8.4 leads to a payo¤ function that is again an increasing
and concave function of and
In this nal case, traders play in the rst period as if they were in the second period without
any previously revealed information. Referring to the second stage analysis of the (CC) case,
we have
Plugging those optimal strategies into the order ow lead to the following decomposition:
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If liquidity trade grows much bigger from stage 1 to stage 2, it is optimal to conceal
its information when the opponent conceals it.
Q.E.D.
and no history e¤ect with The expectation of the ex-interim prot reads
(36)
As intuition suggest, there is a rst period advantage to reveal its information. Further-
more, since trader is always revealing, the better informed he is, the better it is for trader
to use that public information for himself ; hence is a positive and is bigger for
large values of
In the second stage, the public information in this case is , thus
. The usual methods of decomposition for the order ow give coe¢cient
and leading to a complex formula of and an even more complex one
for the ex-ante prot (cf. appendix 8.5) The overall expected payo¤
is as usual an increasing and concave function of and
The previous analysis allows to characterize the equilibrium of the simple matrix game
with simultaneous moves described in section 4. The equilibrium set crucially depends on the
relative size of the liquidity trade in the two periods, because this ratio inuence the depth
parameter: the amount of liquidity trade appears to be a cake to be divided between the
two informed traders. More precisely, the game can be considered as a constant-sum game
between and once the dimension of the exogenous trade is xed. As intuition suggests, the
bigger the volume of trade present in the market for hedging or other liquidity reasons, the
higher the prot insiders can get. Hence, if stage 2 displays signicantly more liquidity than
stage 1, traders have the incentive to hide their information in order to exploit it successfully
in the last stage. For instance, interpreting stage 2 as the period lasting from the xing until
the closing time (17:00) is equivalent to set because the xing is about 1/10 of the
days trade ( is an inverse variance). In that case the conclusion of Lemma 2 is reversed.





































If the set of Nash equilibria of the game is for precisions
not too dissimilar, otherwise the equilibrium is asymmetric and thus in




In the literature (Holden & Subrahmanyam (1992), Kyle (1989), Foster & Viswanathan
(1993)) it is well known that increasing the competition between informed trader leads towards
more e¢cient prices, but this result is obtained keeping the average liquidity trade volume
constant. We nd that this result is robust with the possibility of informational asymmetries
between traders. In fact, assuming is constant liquidity trade across stages 1 and 2 (i.e.,
) we have the following result:
ine¢cient
By lemma 2, if a player conceals then the best reply for the other trader is to
reveal. Therefore in equilibrium at least one trader ( w.l.o.g.) reveals which leads us to
compare and . As seen on gure 3 below ( on the right axis, on the left axis),
when is larger than which means that trader will optimally reveal,
thus the equilibrium is On the other hand, if is large and quite low, then trader
prefers to conceal so that the equilibrium is asymmetric and . Observe that the



























If both traders conceal their information in equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Figure 4
The better informed trader (as the overcondent one in Kyle & Wang) trades more aggres-
sively because market depth is high, since market makers are willing to provide more depth
than they otherwise would since they cannot distinguish between informed and uninformed
orders. Badly informed player trades a little since he gets higher prot waiting to be the
unique informed on the market in the second period.
The size of liquidity trade can totally change this result. When the second stage is
times more active than the rst one, then the variance is squared and
As seen on gure 4 below, we always have Hence at least one
trader ( w.l.o.g.) conceal his information. By lemma 4, if a player conceals then the best


















6 Sequential revelation of information
Yet we have shown that the pre-opening phase is protable for informed traders who can estimate the
exogenous volume of trade.
Because traders have the possibility to gain on a substantially bigger liquidity trade during
the rest of the day, they both prefer to wait to use their private information. The more the
exogenous trade the higher, , the depth of the market, the higher prot
possibilities for insiders.
Clearly, given the structure of the game that uses simultaneous moves, the correct com-
parison must be between the trading volume at the xing and the trading volume at another
precise instant of the day: this permits to consider (the precision of the volume at the
xing) relatively high with respect to , and our analysis shows that for those value of
the xing price is presumably e¢cient at least if information asymmetries are not too
important: in this sense, a model including the analysis of these asymmetries is more general
than a symmetric one. However, relevant cases of ine¢ciency could arise, in particular if
during the day other moments of high activity are expected (as the opening of American
markets for European stock exchanges).
In the previous section we have characterized the equilibrium set in linear pure strategies of
the two-stage game with simultaneous moves. Changing the timing of the moves for informed
players, allows us to analyze the problem of information revelation in the pre-opening period.
Empirically, Biais & al. (1997) show that, in the case of Paris Bourse, the greatest
activity occurs in the very last minutes of the pre-opening, typically, between 9:50 and 10:00.
This phenomenon suggests that traders are careful not to reveal their information before the
market opens. On the ground of this empirical evidence, we have interpreted stage 0 as the
time period between 8:30 and 9:50 where traders submit only notional orders and stage 1 the
remaining time to 10:00, where they simultaneously submit real orders.
We will now motivate this ad-hoc setting by showing that no trader in equilibrium submit
a revealing order before the market opens. In practice, this guarantees that traders wait
until the very last minutes of the pre-opening before using their inside, and a long-lasting
pre-opening phase is completely ine¤ective as a information disclosure device .
Consider the case where trader can submit an order before trader moves in stage one:
in other words, he has the choice to reveal before or wait until stage one, and in this case
and will play (simultaneously) the game as in stage one described before. Revealing before
could give to player an advantage in the sense of Stackelberg leadership, and moreover, it
permits to to get priority for his orders in the xing but it reduces the impact of his private




























Notice that to reveal his own information before the opponents does not simply mean
to submit a notional order before them. The revealing trader must commit to implement
the desired belief revision. Indeed, if he changes this order by a new one before 10:00, the
opponents and the market makers will also revise their belief on the ground of this new order.
The modied game is now composed by two phases: one occurs during the pre)opening,
and the second one will be denoted as the continuation game. In the rst phase, trader
chooses the optimal order to enter the book, and this order has to be considered as a notional
order, since it is set before 10:00 am. He can then choose to reveal his type, or simply he
can not exploit this opportunity, leaving the game as before. For simplicity, we suppose now
that the continuation game is a one-shot, simultaneous moves game equal to that presented
before with only the nal stage. At this stage, both informed players reveal their information
for sure, and we can then refer to the correspondent payo¤s previously determined. If trader
does not reveal before the simultaneous game, he will be as in the case obtaining
an expected prot equal to . If trader reveals before moves, the latter will be in a
situation equivalent to the case . Then, the prot for player is given by . A
trade-o¤ arises for player when he submits a revealing order before stage one. Revealing his
type gives to his opponent a strategic advantage for the real game, but gives to the right
of priority in execution for his order at the xing. We can easily quantify the loss for due
to revealing behavior before the xing with a plot of shown on gure 5 below
( on the right axis, on the left axis).
The gain for due to priority execution in case of ties in the order book is linked to
the specic matching rule used in many stock exchanges. In our model we suppose traders




::  ;  :
::
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Proposition 5
Proof
During the pre-opening phase no information is revealed.
See gure 5 above.
Quantitatively in our model the equilibrium expected prots for the nal period belong
to the interval for any vector Hence, to reveal information in a phase of
notional orders the expected gain should be (see gure 5) in that is almost 3%
of the equilibrium prot. We can conclude that players will begin to reveal information when
they estimate that the risk of communication breakdown or the expected percentage gain in
obtaining a priority in execution sums at least to 3%. This happens typically at the very last
minutes of the pre-opening, and then this behavior, observed by Biais & al. (1997), seems to
be rational, at least in the sloppy sense described here.
To understand more formally the role of pre-opening, we are studying a one stage model
where both insiders and market makers cannot observe the exogenous trade present in the
market. Thus it seems informed traders have an interest to estimate it during the pre-opening.
But it could be that both players want to bias the estimate of their opponent in order to
mislead his perception of the signal revealed at that stage. A formal analysis of this case will
be presented in the following version of the paper.
In the studies that address the problem of aggregation of information by equilibrium prices
the role of asymmetries between informed traders has been neglected. The results of Kyle
(1985), Holden & Subrahmanyam (1992) consider the equilibrium in a centralized, order-
driven continuous nancial market with a monopolist of information or more competitors
with the same information. They point out that even when the insider is relatively small
with respect to the dimension of the market, he can strategically inuence the prices, and it
is only the competition among informed that matters.
We show that the role of asymmetries is crucial in order to dene the e¢ciency properties
of prices. We characterize the linear, pure strategies equilibrium set as a function of the
precision of private signals and the volume of liquidity trade present on the market. Keeping
aside the inuence of the latter, we show that the more precise the signal, the higher the
incentive to reveal it at the rst stage, but the optimal response of a less-informed trader
can be to hide its own information. Asymmetric equilibria hence arise if the insides have
considerably di¤erent precision. In the symmetric case, we nd the result of Holden &
Subrahmanyam as a special case. This result goes in the direction of Kyle & Wang (1997)
where they assess in a static model the more aggressiveness of an overcondent player.
The competition between asymmetric agents has a really di¤erent nature from the one




8.1 The Paris Bourse7
All these informations were provided to us by the Bourse de Paris (SBF).
The model presented here provides a meaningful extension of the literature on insider
trading since the information typically di¤ers across individuals (even the same signal could
be interpreted in di¤erent ways between two di¤erent economic agents). Our result could be
extended to a multi-stage game but the analytical solution would be practically impossible
to assess.
Finally, we have been able to explain the puzzle described by Biais & al. (1997) on
the role of the pre-opening phase in information disclosure. Contrary to the theoretical
prediction of Vives (1995), Biais & al. notice that in the Paris Bourse the disclosure of
private information happens from 9:45 to 10:00 while some gaming activity is observed before.
With a slight by di¤erent timing in our model we easily prove that informed traders in
equilibrium never reveal information before the xing. It is only in the very last minutes
of the pre-opening stage that informed traders reveal some information because the risk of
communication breakdown becomes serious and the importance of priority in order execution
is relevant. We can hence conclude that a long-lasting phase of pre-opening plays no role in
the information revelation.
Paris bourse works as a centralized, order-driven market where a computerised system collects
the orders and quotes the equilibrium price maximizing trades, breaking ties by selecting the
price nearest to the last quotation at 17:00, the preceding day. This algorithm is a good proxy
of the theoretical clearing price. There are about 60 rms who have the right to place orders
on the market ; they get the most complete information in real time (to be described later
on) through a network. We call a trader any employee of those rms, while a large investor
designates any mutual fund, bank or nancial institution and a small investor is any private
household.
The market opens at 8:30 but until 10:00, all orders are notional, thus the price computed
by the system is also notional (cours théorique douverture). This stage is known as the
pre-opening while the rest of the day from 10:00 until 17:00 is known as the opening-active
period.
Any trade that has not been cancelled before 10:00 will be executed at 10:00 or later,
depending on the liquidity of the market and on the size and the type of the order. The
rst quoted price of the day at 10:00 is call the . An important feature is that orders
submitted before the xing are lled in priority to those placed later on.
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The pre-opening is useful for large investors who want to trade the asset for portfolio
hedging reasons. A large order placed later than 10:00 faces the risk of being sliced and
executed at prices arising in a less liquid market than in the xing.
Another source of liquidity trade comes from private households who place orders to their
banks in the evening so that many small orders are transmitted to the traders early in the
morning (before 9:00). They constitute a signicant part of the notional orders ( 10%) but
a lesser part of the global amount ( 5%) .
The xing collects 10% of the whole day trade, it is therefore one of the most liquid
moment of the day. This characteristic is very important given our results on the link between
liquidity volume and e¢ciency of prices.
In Paris, the only accepted orders are those set by the specialist allowed to operate in
the market. Moreover, all specialists can observe the orders placed by the others. Under
this observable structure, we have conjectured that for any player is optimal to mislead the
estimate the opponents try to obtain of liquidity trade with fake orders. We now turn to a
more rigorous argument in defense of this conjecture.
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Combining (11) and (37), equation (9) becomes
(38)
Symmetrically, (10) leads to
(39)
with Solving this system gives
(40)
(41)
Now we can easily obtain the linear pricing rule for the market makers for the second stage.
Combining and (8) we obtain Identifying the
coe¢cients of this linear equation, we obtain and leading through (41) to




Notice that when and tend to zero, tends also to zero, thus (43) is the exact
counterpart to (12) the market depth in the rst stage.
Observe from (42) that thus we can also simplify
with to obtain
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In the body of the text, we obtain for the rst period and
so that and and In the second period,




Finally, we are able to compute the ex-interim prots (27) and (28)
Since and are correlated, we need to factorize and before proceeding to the
ex-ante prots. We obtain
with and Using
and and the expectation of is
(47)
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This case is quite symmetric with the RC one. We obtain for the rst period,
and , we get and . Now, trader is placing a constant order
but in a , there is more competition on the market and therefore
the reaction of the market makers is stronger: The price thus obtained
is
The rst period prot is
Because trader does not use his information i.e., , the ex-interim ex-
pectation is and using we obtain the ex-ante rst period prot as
(48)
In the second stage, , and , thus
(49)
where (notice the asymmetry between and )
Similarly
(50)
Using symmetry with care, the ex-interim prot formula of the concealing agent is the
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Working out the correlations between the random variables involved, we are led to the
following constants
in order to get the ex-ante second period prot
(51)
The global ex-ante prot is the sum of (48) and (51)
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with
As usual, to compute the ex-ante prot we take into account that and are correlated
with , thus from
we obtain
(55)
where a constant is computed for each of the 4 independent random variables.
To conclude, the global ex-ante prot is the sum of (52) and (55).
(56)
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